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OP-ed



By Emil Malak — | June 20, 2026 Op-ed


THE RISK OF A RUSSIAN WARNING STRIKE ON GERMAN INFRASTRUCTURE


You Are Becoming a Party to a War You Did Not Choose

An Op-Ed by Emil Malak


A concerned observer warning of a possible third world war brewing in Europe


I have long admired the German people for your discipline, your engineering excellence, your economic strength, and the moral seriousness with which you rebuilt your nation after 1945. It is precisely because of that respect that I write this warning rather than withhold it. Germany is drifting, almost without public debate, across a line that Moscow interprets very differently than Berlin does. The danger is not that Germany has chosen war. The danger is that Germany may be becoming a belligerent in Russian eyes without ever consciously deciding to be one.


FROM FINANCIER TO ARSENAL: GERMANY'S WEAPONS FACTORIES NOW BECOME RUSSIAN TARGETS


An Introduction: Why Russia May Strike German Manufacturing Sites First

When a nation moves from providing financial support to an ally into actual weapons manufacturing on its own soil, it crosses a threshold that changes how adversaries perceive threat and calculate response. Germany has crossed this threshold. By establishing drone factories, weapons assembly plants, and munitions production facilities in Munich, Berlin, Hamburg, and other German cities, Germany has transformed itself from a financial backer of Ukraine into a direct contributor to weapons systems striking Russian territory.


This transformation creates a critical vulnerability that German political leaders have not adequately addressed: these German weapons factories are now potential Russian military targets.


In Russian military doctrine, targeting enemy war production is a standard element of warfighting strategy. Russia did not need to threaten German civilians or German cities in the past because Germany was not producing weapons for use against Russian territory. But now that German factories are manufacturing drones, loitering munitions, and weapons components designed specifically to strike Russian targets, Russia's strategic calculus changes fundamentally.


Russia now has a military rationale—in Russian eyes, a legitimate military target set—represented by German weapons manufacturing facilities. If Russia decided to demonstrate resolve, to impose costs on German escalation, or to disrupt the supply of weapons flowing to Ukraine, these factories would be logical targets. A precision strike on a drone manufacturing facility near Munich, or on a weapons assembly plant near Berlin, would serve Russian interests without requiring strikes on civilian infrastructure or transportation networks.


This is the critical vulnerability Germany has created for itself by becoming not just a supporter of Ukraine, but a manufacturer of weapons against Russia.


A CRITICAL SHIFT THAT MAKES GERMANY A TARGET

For three years, Germany's primary role in the Ukraine conflict was that of a financier and supplier of existing military stocks—a familiar and limited category in great-power conflict. Germany was writing checks and sending equipment from warehouses. That role was manageable, limited in scope, and clearly differentiated from actual participation in warfare. Germany could argue, with some legitimacy, that it was supporting Ukraine but not directly participating in combat operations against Russia.


That has changed. Over the past year, Germany has moved into something fundamentally different: co-manufacturing and joint production of weapons systems inside German territory. This is not the provision of existing weapons. This is active participation in the creation of new weapons designed to strike Russian targets.


Public reporting now links several major German companies directly to weapons production initiatives for Ukraine. The implications of this shift are profound and have not been adequately debated in German political discourse.


Quantum Systems, headquartered in the Munich region, has publicly announced joint German-Ukrainian drone production initiatives and direct deliveries of drones to the Ukrainian armed forces. The company is involved in what public reports describe as a German-Ukrainian venture called Quantum Frontline Industries, which is actively producing drones for Ukrainian military use. These are not drones produced in Ukraine and then transferred to German companies. These are drones being manufactured in Germany by German companies in partnership with Ukrainian entities. The factories are on German soil. The workers are German. The production facilities are German infrastructure.


Helsing, a German defense technology company based in Berlin, has become deeply involved in artificial intelligence-enabled defense systems and drone programs. Public reports have linked the company to drone programs directly supporting Ukrainian military operations. Helsing is not simply providing software or technical assistance from afar. The company is involved in active development and production activities in Berlin, creating weapons systems designed for Ukrainian use against Russian targets.


Rheinmetall, Germany's largest defense contractor, has substantially expanded its drone activities and has announced production of loitering munitions—essentially flying bombs that can search for targets and attack them autonomously—and other unmanned systems being manufactured on German soil for Ukrainian use. Rheinmetall operates factories across Germany. These factories are now producing weapons designed to strike Russian territory.


Auterion, a Munich-based company, has been reported as cooperating with Ukrainian partners on long-range drone projects, with manufacturing and development activities located near Munich. These are long-range drones designed to penetrate deep into Russian territory and strike Russian targets. They are being developed and manufactured in Munich.


Beyond these companies, Berlin and Kyiv have signed formal agreements on co-production of long-range systems, with manufacturing elements explicitly planned on German territory. These are not private commercial arrangements. These are formal government agreements between the German government and the Ukrainian government establishing weapons production on German soil. The implications are far more serious than private sector involvement.


These agreements mean that German factories are now producing components, assembling complete systems, and testing weapons that will be used to strike deep inside Russian territory. German workers are assembling drones that will carry explosives into Russia. German engineers are designing systems intended to destroy Russian military targets. German facilities are serving as production lines for an ongoing bombing campaign against Russia.


DANGEROUS RHETORIC: WHEN WORDS BECOME COMMITMENTS

One of the most worrying developments in the deterioration of German-Russian relations is not the movement of troops or the transfer of weapons, but rather the increasingly confrontational language being used by senior political and military leaders on both sides. History teaches a crucial lesson: wars become more likely when diplomacy is replaced by public rhetoric that portrays the other side as an existential threat, as an enemy that cannot be negotiated with, or as a power that must be defeated at any cost.


The danger lies not only in what is said, but in how those statements are interpreted by audiences at home and abroad. Leaders may intend to reassure allies, to strengthen deterrence, or to rally domestic support at home. Yet the opposing side may read the same words as evidence of hostile intent and preparation for wider war. Once such rhetoric becomes public, it hardens positions on both sides and makes compromise politically impossible.


Russian officials, particularly Dmitry Medvedev (former President and current Security Council Deputy Chairman), have become among the Kremlin's most outspoken voices on Germany. Medvedev has repeatedly accused German leaders of harboring what he calls "revenge aspirations," of pursuing Russophobia, and of attempting to achieve Russia's strategic defeat. Most ominously, Medvedev has explicitly warned against repeating what happened on June 22, 1941—a reference to Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, one of the most traumatic dates in Russian national memory.


President Vladimir Putin has criticized German leaders for forgetting the lessons of the Second World War and for supporting what he frames as a proxy war against Russia. Russian officials increasingly describe the conflict not as a limited regional dispute over Ukraine, but as an existential confrontation between Russia and the entire Western alliance. From Moscow's perspective, each new weapons delivery, each training mission, and each public statement about defeating Russia reinforces the belief that Germany is already a de facto participant in the conflict.


On the German side, statements have also grown significantly more forceful. The head of the German Air Force declared that Germany was ready to "fight tonight" in defense of NATO territory. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has repeatedly called for Germany to become "war-ready"—using the German word "kriegstüchtig"—and has warned repeatedly of the Russian threat, reflecting a broader shift in German defense policy toward confrontation. Political figures such as Annalena Baerbock and Friedrich Merz have framed the conflict in explicitly existential terms, as a struggle for the very survival of European democracy and security.


While such language may be intended to demonstrate resolve and commitment to allies, the effect is to harden positions on both sides and make compromise politically toxic. When leaders describe a conflict in existential terms, backing down or negotiating becomes politically impossible. The rhetoric itself becomes a cage that limits options.


Historical Context: NATO Expansion and Russian Security Concerns

President Putin has repeatedly cited NATO's eastward expansion and the prospect of Ukraine joining the alliance as a direct threat to Russia's security, arguing that Western powers broke earlier assurances given during the Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's collapse. In 1990, during talks on German reunification, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and other Western leaders assured Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand "one inch eastward" beyond a unified Germany—assurances documented in declassified records, though they were verbal and not formalized in a binding treaty for all of Eastern Europe. NATO later expanded in 1999 and 2004, bringing its military infrastructure closer to Russia's borders. Ukraine's pursuit of NATO membership, which includes collective defense commitments, was viewed by Moscow as an unacceptable red line, especially given proposals for enhanced military cooperation that could include advanced weapons systems near Russian territory. This mirrors the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when President John F. Kennedy firmly rejected Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba—just 90 miles from the U.S.—imposing a naval blockade and forcing their withdrawal through intense diplomacy. Russia has long argued that placing NATO-aligned military capabilities on its immediate border, as nearly occurred with Ukraine, posed a comparable existential threat that left it with little choice but to act.


THE GREATEST DANGER: MISCALCULATION

The greatest danger in the current trajectory is not necessarily deliberate escalation by either side, but rather miscalculation. When leaders repeatedly describe a conflict in existential terms, public expectations harden, political flexibility shrinks, and diplomatic off-ramps disappear. The space for negotiation and compromise collapses.


History demonstrates repeatedly that major conflicts are often preceded by periods in which each side convinces itself that the other is bluffing or unwilling to respond. Decision-makers underestimate the resolve of their opponents or overestimate their own capability to control escalation. These miscalculations have led to catastrophe throughout modern history.


Germany and Russia have already paid a catastrophic price for such miscalculations in the twentieth century. The lessons of that era should serve as a warning, not a template to be repeated. True statesmanship demands not only military preparedness but also restraint, strategic patience, and the preservation of communication channels even in times of deep disagreement.


THE RISK OF A RUSSIAN WARNING STRIKE ON GERMAN INFRASTRUCTURE

I have been warning about this danger for weeks. In three recent op-eds I highlighted the growing risk of escalation and a potential Russian strike on German soil before the end of 2026:

May 11, 2026: "Europe at the cliff: A citizen warning about nuclear miscalculation on European soil"

May 21, 2026: "A Citizen's warning from inside the margin of error: Avoid a third European war (update)"

May 31, 2026: "Europe's last exit before the nuclear abyss (update)"


If tensions continue to rise, Russia could launch a limited "warning strike" against Germany. The goal would not be conquest or full-scale war, but to demonstrate resolve, create uncertainty, exert political pressure, and force a change in German policy—all while trying to avoid triggering a wider NATO conflict.


A plausible scenario could involve Russia firing a small number of Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles (or similar systems) at carefully selected, high-value civilian-economic targets to maximize disruption with minimal direct military casualties.


The more leaders on both sides speak in terms of confrontation, inevitability, and total victory, the narrower becomes the path to diplomacy, compromise, and peace.


THE ORESHNIK MOMENT: RUSSIA WILL NOT TOLERATE DRONE SATURATION

Recent events have made this risk immediate and concrete. In major attack waves around June 17-18, 2026, Russia reported facing approximately 1,000 Ukrainian drones targeting multiple Russian regions, including Moscow itself. The Kapotnya oil refinery—a key fuel supplier for the Russian capital—was struck, causing fires and significant disruptions to Russia's energy infrastructure. Other targets included energy facilities, industrial sites, and military-related infrastructure across Russian territory.


This is significant because President Vladimir Putin will not sit passively and watch a drone saturation war being conducted against Russian territory. As these attacks continue and intensify, Russia will almost certainly take drastic measures to warn the Europeans—by striking Germany directly with Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles or similar advanced systems. Such a strike would serve as a powerful demonstration, showing that continued escalation carries direct consequences on German soil, while remaining calibrated short of triggering a full NATO collective response.


Russia would likely have a choice of targets: drone-related supply factories and production facilities where German companies are manufacturing components for Ukrainian weapons, or critical transportation infrastructure, or both. Potential targets could include high-value civilian-economic sites selected to maximize economic disruption while keeping direct military casualties relatively limited.


Five Economically Significant Transportation Links in Germany

The Rahmede Viaduct is located near Lüdenscheid in North Rhine-Westphalia. This infrastructure became a symbol of Germany's vulnerability when its closure caused major freight delays, commuting disruptions, and increased transportation costs throughout western Germany. A strike here would immediately disrupt commerce across a vast region.


The Leverkusen Rhine Bridge on the A1 Motorway is one of the most important Rhine crossings in Germany, carrying substantial commercial and industrial traffic through the Rhine-Ruhr region. It forms part of one of Germany's busiest motorway corridors and is essential to the functioning of German commerce.


The Köhlbrand Bridge in Hamburg is a critical transportation link serving the Port of Hamburg, Germany's largest seaport. The bridge plays an essential role in connecting port operations with national and international logistics networks. Damage to this bridge would immediately disrupt Germany's ability to export goods through its primary port.


The Rügen Bridge in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is the principal fixed connection between mainland Germany and Rügen Island, supporting tourism, commerce, and regional transportation in northeastern Germany. Its destruction would isolate an entire region.


The Fehmarn Belt Corridor in Schleswig-Holstein is a strategically important European transportation corridor linking Germany with Denmark and Scandinavia. It serves as a key trade and logistics route between Central Europe and Northern Europe, and disruption would affect the entire northern European trading system.


Together, these transportation assets illustrate a broader reality of modern economies: prosperity depends upon efficient movement of people, goods, raw materials, and industrial products. Delays, closures, or disruptions affecting major transportation corridors can increase costs, reduce productivity, strain supply chains, and create ripple effects throughout regional and national economies. A single well-placed strike on any of these bridges would not determine Germany's economic future, but it would cause significant pain—the kind of pain Russia might inflict as a "warning" about the costs of continued escalation.


NATO WEAKNESS: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH

Germany should not assume automatic, unlimited support from its NATO allies. This is an uncomfortable truth that German political leaders are reluctant to acknowledge, but it is essential to understanding Germany's true strategic position.


NATO without substantial and sustained American participation would be far weaker than many Germans assume. The United States maintains superior air power, strategic bombing capability, and the nuclear deterrent that backs NATO's collective defense. Remove American commitment, and NATO Europe faces Russia on much more equal terms.


Additionally, the United States faces significant domestic divisions and competing strategic priorities, particularly the pivot toward the Indo-Pacific and preparation for potential conflict with China. American political leaders across the political spectrum are increasingly questioning whether the United States should continue committing vast resources to defending Europe when American interests in Asia are growing more critical.


European countries, including Britain, are even weaker than many acknowledge. European nations are often strong on rhetoric and political declarations but lack the unified will and the sustained capacity for a prolonged high-intensity conflict against a nuclear-armed Russia. European militaries have been designed for peacekeeping operations, humanitarian missions, and limited interventions—not for sustained major-power warfare.


This path—the current German policy of escalating support for Ukraine with manufacturing involvement on German soil, combined with confrontational rhetoric about confronting Russia—risks becoming the start of a third world war in Europe. Russia retains significant advantages in missile forces, integrated air defense systems, nuclear deterrence, and sheer scale of military-industrial capacity. Miscalculation in this environment could lead to catastrophe that neither side intended.


THE MILITARY REALITY: GERMANY CANNOT MATCH RUSSIA

Germany's political leaders are making threats and commitments that Germany is fundamentally incapable of backing up militarily. This represents reckless political posturing divorced from military reality.


The numbers are brutal and unambiguous. Germany's air force operates approximately 220 front-line combat aircraft, primarily consisting of 138 Eurofighter Typhoons. Russia's air force operates approximately 1,000 to 1,300 front-line combat aircraft. Russia has 5 to 6 times more combat aircraft than Germany. This is not a marginal difference or a gap that can be overcome through superior technology or pilot skill. It is an overwhelming numerical superiority that Germany cannot overcome in sustained combat.


What Germany lacks that Russia possesses is equally important. Germany operates zero strategic bombers. Russia operates 130 to 150 strategic bombers (the Tu-95, Tu-160, and Tu-22M) capable of striking German targets from Russian territory while remaining beyond effective German air defense range. Germany operates no long-range cruise missiles. Russia operates thousands of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers—meaning Russia can strike German targets from Russian soil while German fighters cannot reach the aircraft launching those missiles.


Germany operates Patriot and IRIS-T air defense systems. Russia operates over 100 S-400 systems and is deploying newer S-500 systems—advanced air defense integrated into a sophisticated network. Germany participates in NATO nuclear sharing, which means German Eurofighters can carry American nuclear weapons, but only with American authorization and only if NATO decides to employ them. Russia operates 6,000 independent nuclear warheads under Russian control alone.


If Germany Fought Russia Alone: A Catastrophic Scenario

If Germany were forced into military confrontation with Russia without NATO support, the outcome would be catastrophic for Germany within weeks.


In the first two weeks, Russia would establish air superiority through numerical overwhelming of German air defenses. German air defenses would be unable to defend against coordinated Russian bomber and cruise missile strikes.


In weeks two through four, Russian air strikes would paralyze German infrastructure—ports, power plants, transportation networks, manufacturing facilities. German ground forces would become vulnerable without air cover. German pilots, numbering only 3,000 to 4,000 front-line combat pilots, would face exhaustion through attrition rates typical of sustained combat.


By weeks four through eight, the German air force would be destroyed or rendered non-functional. German aircraft production, which manufactures 2 to 3 Eurofighters per year, could not generate replacement aircraft at the rate of losses. The German economy would collapse due to infrastructure destruction and energy disruption. Germany would have no capacity to continue the conflict.


The outcome would be complete German military defeat. Germany would have no option except surrender.


Germany is secure only because Germany is part of NATO and only because the United States commits American air power—2,000 or more combat aircraft—to European defense. Within the NATO framework, collective air power (4,000 to 5,000 aircraft from all NATO nations) exceeds Russia's capability. But this advantage would evaporate immediately if the United States reduced its commitment to Europe, if NATO fractured due to internal disagreements, or if American political support for European defense continued declining.


What German Leaders Say vs. What They Can Actually Do

Yet Defense Minister Boris Pistorius declares: "Germany will support Ukraine for as long as it takes. Germany is prepared for any scenario."


This is not true. Germany cannot independently defend itself. Germany operates one-fifth to one-sixth the combat aircraft that Russia has. Germany has no strategic bombers, no long-range cruise missiles, no capacity for sustained conflict. Germany's claimed "preparation" is a political fiction.


Chancellor Scholz asserts: "Germany's support for Ukraine is unconditional."


This is also not true. Germany's support is entirely conditional on NATO protection. If Russia strikes German infrastructure, Germany would be forced to prioritize German security over Ukraine support.


Foreign Minister Baerbock declares: "We are fighting a war against Russia. Russia will lose this war."


This statement is dangerous political rhetoric without military foundation. Germany is not fighting Russia. Germany cannot fight Russia. If Germany were fighting Russia alone, Germany would lose within weeks.


THE STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY: THREE DANGEROUS ILLUSIONS

German policymakers operate under three dangerous illusions that could lead Europe toward catastrophe:


First illusion: That NATO will always protect Germany. This is increasingly uncertain. American strategic focus is shifting toward China. American political support for European defense is declining. NATO's internal unity is fragile. The guarantee that once seemed absolute is now conditional and subject to change.


Second illusion: That American commitment to Europe is unlimited. It is not. American commitment is conditional on European cooperation, on European willingness to spend on defense, and on American perception that Europe is not pursuing reckless policies that increase American risk. If Germany pursues policies that American leaders view as dangerous and destabilizing, American commitment could diminish.


Third illusion: That Germany can afford to escalate confrontation with Russia without consequences. Germany cannot. If these conditions change—if America reduces European commitment, if NATO fractures, if the US withdraws military forces from Europe—Germany would face Russian military dominance without defense. The escalation strategy assumes conditions that may not hold.


German policymakers should not pursue policies that depend on unlimited NATO protection or on unlimited American commitment. German policymakers should not escalate confrontation with Russia on the assumption that NATO will automatically provide military support. German policymakers should not assume that NATO will always protect Germany in every scenario. These assumptions are increasingly unreliable.


WHAT GERMANY SHOULD DO: CHOOSE PRUDENCE OVER ESCALATION

Germany's true strength lies in its economy, its innovation, its engineering excellence, and its capacity for stable governance—not in becoming a frontline state in someone else's war. To avoid disaster, German leaders should make the following strategic choices:


First, halt further escalation of military aid to Ukraine, including drones, components, and highly visible support for weapons production on German soil. Germany has already provided substantial aid. Further escalation increases Russian perception of threat and invites Russian retaliation against Germany that Germany cannot defend against. The prudent course is consolidation, not further escalation.


Second, reduce inflammatory rhetoric and demands for Russia's strategic defeat. Leaders should stop describing the conflict in existential terms and stop making statements about Russia's defeat that create expectations Germany cannot fulfill. Inflammatory rhetoric hardens positions on both sides and eliminates the space for compromise. Statesmanship requires language that preserves diplomatic options.


Third, pursue quiet, confidential diplomacy with Russia to re-establish channels that have been severed and to seek a modus vivendi—a way of coexisting and managing disagreements without armed conflict. Diplomatic channels are essential even in times of deep disagreement. Backchannels, quiet negotiations, and discreet conversations are how conflicts are ultimately resolved.


Fourth, prioritize genuine energy independence and economic resilience rather than confrontation. Germany should invest in renewable energy, rebuild nuclear capacity, and reduce dependence on energy imports. This is a path to strength that does not require military confrontation and that builds long-term German security through economic resilience rather than military escalation.


A FINAL WARNING: THE PATH AHEAD

Great nations demonstrate wisdom by avoiding unnecessary catastrophes. Europe has already suffered two devastating world wars in the past 130 years. The costs of those conflicts—measured in dead, in destroyed cities, in shattered lives, in lost generations—should haunt every European leader. German policymakers carry a historic responsibility to ensure that a third world war is not added to that tragic list.


The German people deserve leaders who prioritize their long-term security and prosperity above all else. The current policy path risks leading in the opposite direction—toward a confrontation that Germany cannot win and that could lead to catastrophe for all of Europe.


Germany stands at a critical juncture. The decisions made in the coming months will determine whether Germany moves toward de-escalation and stable coexistence with Russia, or toward military confrontation that Germany cannot win and that could lead to catastrophe for all of Europe.


The choice is stark. The window is closing. The moment for wise decision-making is now.


CONCLUSION: TURN TOWARD DE-ESCALATION BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE

The path forward is clear, though difficult. Germany must turn away from escalation and toward de-escalation. Germany must reduce rhetoric and increase diplomacy. Germany must prioritize German security and German interests above all else. Germany must recognize that NATO protection is conditional, that American commitment is uncertain, and that Germany's true strength lies not in military confrontation but in economic resilience and strategic wisdom.


Turn toward de-escalation and diplomacy before it is too late.


The alternative—continued escalation, hardening rhetoric, military confrontation that Germany cannot win—leads only toward a third world war in Europe. No rational person wants that outcome. Yet the current trajectory, if continued, leads inexorably in that direction.


There is still time to change course. There is still time to choose wisdom over escalation, diplomacy over confrontation, de-escalation over war. But that time is running out.


Emil Malak is a geopolitical analyst and commentator based in Vancouver, British Columbia. His writings on European security, energy policy. This op-ed represents his personal views as a concerned observer of USA and European affairs warning of the possible brewing of a third world war in Europe.


Emil Malak Op-Ed | June 20, 2026 - The Risk of a Russian Warning Strike on German Infrastructure | Is Germany in danger of an attack by Russia? | Will Russia attach Germany? | Why would Russia attack Germany? | Is Germany developing drones? | Is Germany investing in drones? | Are drones the future of war? | Is Germany at risk of an attack by Russia? | Has Russia warned Germany? | If Russia attacks Germany what will be their targets? | If Russia attacks Germany where are the possible targets?

NOTE: This content is not the view of nor endorsed by CEOCFO Magazine or its advertisers.

Original Op-ed Published May 11, 2026
Europe at the Cliff: A Citizen's Warning About Nuclear Miscalculation on European Soil

https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped051126.html


May 21, 26 - Update

Europe on the Edge: A Citizen's Warning From Inside the Margin of Error-Avoid a Third European War
https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped052126.html

May 31, 26 - Update
Europe’s Last Exit Before the Nuclear Abyss

https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped053126.html

June 6, 26 - Op-ed
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https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped060626.html

June 7th Op-ed

The Demographic Transformation of Europe: Is Uncontrolled Open-Door Migration Erasing Its Historic Identity?

https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped060726.html

June 10th Op-ed
America's Credibility Runs Through the Strait of Hormuz

https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped061026.html

June 15th Update

Peace with Iran Will Remain Illusory Without Regime Change

https://www.ceocfointerviews.com/emilmalakoped061226.html





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