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OP-ed



By Emil Malak — | June 24, 2026 Op-ed


The Kitchen Table Will Judge the Iran War — and the Verdict Is Already Forming


A question of promises, sacrifice, and how ordinary people will measure the result


Op-ed By Emil Malak


As a geopolitical writer, I have always believed the duty of a writer is not to act as a lobbyist for one side or another, but to speak honestly about how events may be perceived by ordinary people. I may ultimately be proven wrong—history surprises even the most experienced observers. But it is worth discussing not only what governments intend, but how their actions are seen at the kitchen table.


I also want to make one point absolutely clear. I have always held the American people in the highest regard. Throughout my life, I have admired their generosity, their friendliness, their work ethic, and the optimism that has made the United States a symbol of opportunity for millions around the world. To me, America has long represented the belief that with determination and hard work, anyone can pursue the American Dream.


My admiration for the American people, however, should not be mistaken for uncritical support of every decision made by any administration. On the contrary, genuine respect for a nation includes the willingness to examine its policies honestly, particularly when those policies may carry significant geopolitical consequences. My observations are offered in that spirit: not as criticism of America, but as an honest assessment of how events may be perceived by others and how history may ultimately judge them.


There is a temptation, common to those who hold power and to the experts who advise them, to wave away the judgment of the ordinary voter — the man at the kitchen table, the woman at the checkout line, the average Joe who does not read the communiqués and cannot name the negotiators. They don't understand the complexity, the reasoning goes. Perception will catch up to reality. It is a comforting thought. It is also, again and again, how governments fall. In 2024 — a year the Financial Times called "a graveyard for incumbents" — every governing party defending its record in a developed democracy lost vote share, the first time that had happened in nearly 120 years of records; in Britain, fourteen years of Conservative rule ended in a near-twenty-point collapse.¹ Those electorates were not moved by the fine print. They were moved by a feeling: this is not working, and they are not listening.


I raise this because of Iran.


January's False Dawn: The Trio's Bold Rescue Pledge That History May Judge as Empty


Today, three men stand at the center of America's Iran policy: President Donald Trump, Vice President JD Vance, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In early January 2026, as protests swept Iran, they spoke with unusual directness — and they chose clarity over caution.


The unrest was the gravest the Islamic Republic had faced in its forty-seven-year existence. What began on December 28, 2025, as Tehran's Grand Bazaar merchants shuttering their stalls over a collapsing currency spread within days into nationwide demonstrations against clerical rule. The regime answered as it always has: live fire, mass arrests, and, on January 8, a near-total internet blackout meant to hide the killing from the world.²


In that moment, the trio aligned American words with the people in the streets.


President Trump, January 2: *"If Iran shoots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go."*³ Days later, addressing Iranians directly: *"Iranian Patriots, KEEP PROTESTING — TAKE OVER YOUR INSTITUTIONS!!! ... HELP IS ON ITS WAY."*


Vice President Vance, January 8: the United States stands with "the Iranian people, who are advocating for their rights," and with anyone exercising the right of peaceful protest.


Secretary Rubio, January 10: *"The United States supports the brave people of Iran."*


These were not vague diplomatic phrases. They raised expectations — in Iran and among Americans — that Washington would put its power behind people seeking relief from a system that has ruled through repression for nearly five decades.


The American and Iranian Blood Ledger: Lives, Billions, and Broken Promises


The path from January's statements to the present carried real costs, and honesty requires stating them plainly — and only as far as the evidence allows.


On the American side, U.S. Central Command has confirmed 13 service members killed and roughly 380 wounded during Operation Epic Fury; six of those men died in a single refueling-aircraft crash. On the financial side, the figure that is hardest to dispute comes from sworn testimony: the Pentagon's own comptroller told Congress in late April that the operation had cost about $25 billion, most of it in munitions, with a supplemental request still to come. Independent trackers place the direct cost somewhat higher, and broader economic estimates — including elevated fuel prices felt in households across the country — run higher still. These figures remain contested by definition and time horizon, and should be read as the best available accounting rather than a final tally.


On the Iranian side, the people in whose name so much of this began paid the heaviest price. During the winter crackdown, the U.S.-based monitor HRANA documented roughly two thousand killings by mid-January — a figure it cautioned was incomplete, with many cases still under review and some independent estimates running considerably higher. These were largely ordinary Iranians — merchants, students, families — who took to the streets believing a different future was possible.


The average voter does not study deterrence theory. They see promises made, sacrifices incurred, risks taken — and then they ask one question: What was achieved?


The Mullahs' Lifeline: How the Islamabad Deal Rescued the Regime America Promised to Confront


Active fighting has stopped. On June 17, 2026, the United States and Iran signed the fourteen-point Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, opening a sixty-day window for talks toward a more permanent arrangement.¹ Strip away the signing ceremony and the triumphant social-media posts, however, and the framework reads less like a breakthrough than like a careful trade of concrete American concessions for Iranian promises deferred.


The terms tell the story. The U.S. naval blockade is being lifted. The Strait of Hormuz reopens — but on Tehran's terms, through a newly created Persian Gulf Strait Authority, and Iran's own lead negotiator said within days it "will not return to pre-war conditions."¹¹ The Treasury Department will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil and the banking, insurance, and transportation services around it, a benefit slated to take effect almost immediately.¹² The memorandum further gestures toward a reconstruction-and-development fund of "at least $300 billion" and a path to unfreezing billions in Iranian assets — though the administration insists, correctly, that no money is committed until Iran performs, and that any relief is tied to verifiable compliance.¹³ That distinction matters, and I credit it. But the architecture is unmistakable: the United States front-loads tangible relief, while Iran front-loads nothing but its word.


And on the central question — the one the war was fought over — the memorandum postponed rather than resolved. Under its terms Iran maintains the status quo of its nuclear program, with its enriched-uranium stockpile to be down-blended later under terms still to be negotiated, and a commitment "not to acquire a nuclear weapon" that is the very pledge it made and abandoned under the 2015 accord.¹ The ballistic-missile program and the network of regional proxies were excluded from the agenda altogether.¹ In Point Two, both sides pledged "to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs" — language that, to the ordinary reader, sits uneasily beside a President who in January urged Iranians to *take over your institutions.*¹


Most plainly of all: the regime that ordered the crackdown in January remains in power. No fundamental change in Iran's governing structure has occurred. Compressed to a sentence, the ledger reads as a strategic draw at best and a missed opportunity at worst — the clerical regime survived direct confrontation with superior American power, secured breathing room and the prospect of revenue, and avoided the internal reckoning the protests had threatened.


The Perception at the Kitchen Table


This is not an abstract debate in Washington think tanks. It is the conversation in kitchens, workplaces, and town halls: Was the price paid worth the result achieved so far?


Ordinary Americans look at the ledger — the January promises, the lives lost, the hundreds wounded, the tens of billions spent, the prices at the pump, the thousands of Iranians killed in the crackdown — and they see a cease fire framework where the early rhetoric had pointed toward something more decisive. They notice that the core driver of the crisis, the theocratic structure in Tehran, is still intact.


Supporters of the President often tell me there is a larger strategy at work, and that observers should not underestimate what he may do next. They may well be right; I acknowledge the possibility fully. But politics is rarely driven by intentions. It is driven by perceptions, and perceptions are formed by visible outcomes. Whether that perception is fair or unfair is almost secondary, because outcomes are ultimately measured against the expectations leaders themselves helped create.


The challenge facing the trio, then, is not military credibility. It is political credibility. History remembers wars less for their opening stages than for their final outcome, and judge’s leaders not by the strength they displayed but by whether the objectives they named were achieved.


The Gulf States Are Watching Too


The kitchen table is not the only place this is being measured. Across the Gulf, the monarchies that anchored American strategy for half a century — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman — watched the United States go to war with the regime they most feared and then sign a framework that, by their own negotiators' account, left that regime emboldened and the Strait short of the pre-war normal they had demanded. Several of these states absorbed direct Iranian strikes during the war.


For decades these governments have hosted American bases, cooperated on regional security, kept vital energy corridors open, and invested hundreds of billions in Western economies. For just as long, they have viewed Iran not as an ordinary neighbor but as a strategic challenge — over missiles, proxies, and the balance of power in the Gulf. So they will measure this outcome through one plain question: Is Iran stronger or weaker than it was before?


Their response has not been rupture but quiet recalculation — new defense agreements with France and Canada, deepened hedging toward Asia, Russia proven to be a reliable partner — the conduct of allies who have begun to wonder whether a guarantee, once tested, delivered what they had long paid for. Long-standing partnerships are not abandoned overnight. But alliances ultimately depend on confidence and predictability, and allies evaluate not merely strength but reliability — whether sacrifices and risks produced the results that were expected. That, too, is a perception forming about American follow-through, and it will outlast any single news cycle.


Rubio's Gulf Tour: Selling Promises Iran Has Already Refused to Honor


Secretary of State Marco Rubio is now in the Gulf, moving between Abu Dhabi, Kuwait City, and Bahrain, telling America's oldest regional partners that the United States will protect their security, keep the Strait of Hormuz open on fair terms, and stand by the commitments made in January. He speaks of alignment, frank conversation, and long-standing friendships. Yet every assurance he offers collides with the reality Iran has already imposed on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.


Iran has made clear it will not return to pre-war conditions in the Strait. Its negotiators have said so openly. The same regime that absorbed American strikes on its nuclear sites, weathered the protests, and survived the war now sits in a position to extract sanctions relief, banking waivers, and the prospect of a multi-hundred-billion-dollar reconstruction fund while keeping its ballistic-missile program and proxy networks off the agenda entirely. The United States, which entered this conflict with overwhelming military superiority, is now the party offering the tangible concessions up front. Iran offers words and a timetable it controls.


This is not partnership. It is the perception — already forming among Gulf monarchies that host American bases and absorbed Iranian strikes — that Washington is negotiating from a position of political weakness rather than strength. When the country that once spoke of rescuing Iranian protesters and confronting the regime now travels the region reassuring allies that it will not abandon them to the very power it just confronted, the message lands as damage control, not victory. The kitchen table sees the cost in American lives and treasure. The Gulf sees a superpower that went to war, paid the price, and then agreed to terms that leave the regime it challenged not broken, but breathing easier and richer.


Rubio can speak of friendship and security guarantees. Iran has already shown, through its actions and its public statements, that it intends to dictate the pace and the limits of any further concessions. The gap between the promises being sold in the Gulf and the terms Iran has already extracted is not a communications problem. It is the record itself. And records, like kitchen tables, do not forget.


Why an Unfinished War Reshapes 2028, is Ron DeSantis evaluating?


If the kitchen-table verdict lands the way I believe it will — if a large share of voters concludes that a historic opportunity was created and then left unfinished — the consequences will not stop at a single election. They will reshape the question of who leads next. I trace this not as a partisan, but as an observer following the perception logic to where it goes.


The rule is simple and unforgiving: voters assign authorship. A war that ends in a memorandum is a difficult inheritance for the figures most closely tied to it, and fairly or not, the two who carried this policy most visibly into public view — the Vice President and the Secretary of State, both plausible national candidates — will struggle to separate themselves from the ledger they helped write. In politics, proximity to an unfinished outcome is rarely an asset. It is a weight. Every promise replayed, every cost recounted, every image of a regime still standing becomes, by association, theirs.


That same logic points toward a different kind of figure — one who carries executive credibility but bears no fingerprints on the Iran file at all. One name fits that description more completely than any other: Ron DeSantis, who by the end of this year will leave the governorship of Florida after two terms running the nation's third-largest state.¹ His standing rests on the very thing the memorandum conspicuously lacks — a record of delivery rather than a record of promises. He governed an economy larger than most countries', won re-election by a commanding margin, and, decisively for the argument I am making, owns no share of the outcome voters may come to judge so harshly.


So I will state my view plainly, while owning that it is a forecast and not a fact: should the public mood break as I expect, Ron DeSantis is the figure best positioned to emerge as the Republican standard-bearer in 2028, and a serious contender for the presidency itself. Not because of ideology, and not because I am handicapping a primary I cannot yet see — but because the political conditions the Iran file is creating describe him with unusual precision. The electorate that emerges from an unfinished war will want competence demonstrated rather than competence promised, and a leader unburdened by the war itself. That is the opening.


The corollary is just as plain. If the trio close the gap between January's words and the result on the ground — if a durable settlement follows the memorandum — this entire calculus dissolves, and the men who made the policy may yet claim its credit rather than carry its cost. The opening I am describing is not a prediction of failure. It is a description of what failure, if it comes, will hand to whoever stands clear of it. A party that wishes to hold the White House would be wise to see that now, rather than in hindsight.


Drones, Not Promises: The Gulf's Only Real Deterrent Is 5,000 Launched Every Day


If You Want Peace, Prepare to Overwhelm the Enemy


History is clear: the side that can overwhelm its adversary with relentless, low-cost pressure is the side that forces peace. In World War II, the Allies did not win simply by matching German tanks or planes one-for-one. They overwhelmed Nazi Germany through massive strategic bombing campaigns — thousands of aircraft delivering relentless strikes on factories, oil refineries, rail lines, and cities. The Luftwaffe and German industry could not sustain the attrition. The constant, overwhelming pressure broke their will and capacity to fight. The same logic applies today. In the drone age, the ability to launch thousands of low-cost weapons daily can achieve what expensive conventional forces struggle to do: force an enemy to the table or break their aggression.


Enough with the Endless Slaughter — Over 1,200 Israelis Massacred on October 7, 20,000 Palestinian Children Dead, Lebanese Displaced, and the Cycle of Horror Continues


Enough. Enough with the deliberate massacre on October 7, 2023, when Hamas and other Palestinian fighters stormed Israeli communities, murdered over 1,200 people — the vast majority civilians, including women, children, and the elderly — raped, burned families alive in their homes, and took more than 250 hostages. It was an act of pure barbarism designed to provoke maximum terror and outrage.


Enough with the response that has produced its own mountain of suffering: tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians, including over 20,000 children, killed in Gaza. Entire neighborhoods reduced to rubble. Families wiped out. Enough with Lebanese civilians kicked out of their villages by force. Enough with Palestinian families dragged from their land by settlers. Enough with the fanatical Zionist dream of controlling the land "from the river to the sea" — and beyond, to the Nile.


This madness will not stop through more expensive fighter jets, billion-dollar warships, or endless American promises. The only language these regimes truly understand is credible, overwhelming, and immediate cost.


The Drone Future Is Here — Trillion-Dollar Fighter Jets and Warships Are Already Obsolete


Why cheap, mass-produced drones will decide the next wars — and why the Gulf must lead the shift now


The age of trillion-dollar fighter jets and billion-dollar warships deciding wars is ending. Ukraine proved it. Cheap, mass-produced drones — short, medium, and long-range — are now the weapon that deters, prevents, and wins modern conflicts. The Gulf states have the money. Egypt has the population and industrial base. Together they have everything needed to make this their reality. Now it is time to plan and build a drone manufacturing base in Egypt or in the Gulf states, whatever they feel is safer for their future.


Stop buying yesterday's hardware. Start building and, more importantly, launching the one capability that actually changes calculations in Tehran and Tel Aviv. The Gulf should aim for the ability to launch 5,000 drones per day for at least two years — roughly 3.65 million drones in total. That is not a fantasy. It is an industrial target well within reach if treated as a national security emergency.


Picture it clearly. If Iran or its proxies attack again, the Gulf responds with 5,000 drones every single day until the aggression stops. Iran's missile sites, proxy command centers, oil facilities, and leadership compounds would face relentless, low-cost attrition they cannot match or sustain. The same threat applies to any aggressor. Hezbollah's positions in southern Lebanon could be systematically dismantled. Israel would face the same daily pressure it currently imposes on others. No more one-sided air superiority. No more hiding behind expensive systems that a swarm of cheap drones can overwhelm.


Only the credible threat of 5,000 drones launched every single day can break this cycle of horror. Only this strength can force real peace — not endless negotiations that lead nowhere, not more dead children on both sides, not more displaced families, not more massacres.


This is the language these regimes understand: credible, immediate, and overwhelming cost. Building the factories is the foundation. Launching thousands daily is the deterrent .The side that masters drone mass and rapid launch will dictate the future of the region.


The Gulf has the funds. Egypt has the manpower. Together they can end the cycle of vulnerability. Build the capacity. Stock the magazines. Make the threat real and visible.


Then watch how quickly the threats from Iran, the expansionism from certain Israeli factions, and the blackmail from Hezbollah change. The kitchen table in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Cairo already knows the old way is not working. The new way is sitting in the skies over Ukraine. The only question left is whether the Gulf will seize it before the next crisis forces their hand.


America can still play a major supportive role


The United States remains a global leader in advanced technology, artificial intelligence, and innovation. America can help the Gulf states by partnering on next-generation technologies, AI advancements, secure manufacturing systems, and joint research initiatives — creating mutually beneficial economic opportunities that strengthen both American industry and Gulf security at the same time.


The Only Language This Regime Understands: Credible Actionable Threats to Its Economic Lifeline


If the present negotiating window produces only further delay, ambiguity, and cosmetic concessions while the regime retains its core power and revenue, then the strategic logic — not a preference, but the conclusion the regime's own record forces — points toward one remaining instrument short of accepting permanent containment: restoring and intensifying maximum economic pressure by demonstrating the credible ability to sever the regime's primary source of hard currency, its oil-export infrastructure, beginning with Kharg Island. Across four decades, Tehran has shown that it respects existential threats to its economic survival far more readily than statements of concern, evadable sanctions, or frameworks that leave its governing structure and revenue base intact. Kharg handles the overwhelming majority of Iran's seaborne crude exports; sustained disruption there would directly starve the regime of the funds it uses to sustain proxies, repression at home, and its nuclear and missile programs.


This follows directly from the ledger already laid out. The January statements raised clear expectations — among Iranians in the streets and American voters alike — that Washington would back its words with decisive action against a brutal system. The war that followed exacted real costs, in American lives and treasure and in thousands of Iranian civilian deaths during the crackdown, only to conclude with a memorandum that, on present evidence, has left the regime emboldened rather than transformed. Gulf partners who absorbed Iranian strikes are already hedging. Voters are already asking what was achieved.


In that context, targeted, overwhelming pressure on the regime's oil-export backbone is the mechanism most aligned with the original objectives — weakening the source of regional instability and domestic repression without a ground invasion or nation-building. The history with this specific regime suggests that credible threats to its revenue have produced more behavioral adjustment than negotiations conducted from perceived weakness. The wiser course, then, is to treat the current talks with the skepticism they warrant and to prepare the next phase of pressure as the logical extension of the policy already begun — not as a new war, but as the enforcement of the red lines implied by January's words. If the memorandum instead becomes a vehicle for buying time until a more favorable political environment in Washington, the costs already incurred will have purchased only a more dangerous status quo. This regime must ultimately be confronted where its power is most vulnerable: its ability to fund itself. That remains the clearest path consistent with protecting American interests, reassuring allies, and giving the Iranian people the space their protests demanded.


The Iranian people who heard those words in January, and the American families who paid the price that followed, will measure what comes next against what was promised when the streets were crying for freedom. I could be wrong, if the coming weeks deliver verifiable, irreversible change. Events will decide. And the kitchen table, as always, is already deciding.


Emil Malak is a geopolitical analyst and writer based in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.


Emil Malak Op-Ed | June 24, 2026 - The Kitchen Table Will Judge the Iran War — and the Verdict Is Already Forming | Who controls the Strait of Hormuz? | Does Iran Control the Strait of Hormuz? | Does the United States Control the Strait of Hormuz? | Should the US focus on Regime Change in Iran? | Should the United States Make a Deal with Iran? | How will the US Iran War End? | What is the Best Outcome of the United States Iran War | Why Did the US Go to War with Iran? Why Did the US attack Iran?

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